Thank you for the thoughtful propsal @Andre and @amy.sg
I believe the proposed structure might overlook a specific type of conflict of interest prevalent in delegate-led governance. The expressed opinion does not comment on any single delegate’s individual qualities. Resilient systems should be designed with adversarial players in mind.
Delegates, as a stakeholder group, have strong incentives to support the creation of layers, administrative positions, and committees where they take seats. Those positions are lucrative as they rely on election processes, making the roles more sticky than simple re-delegation.
The obvious solution is to prevent delegates from sitting on committees and councils. We recently observed an apparent conflict when delegates who supported the controversial proposal for the Arbitrum gaming fund were elected to sit on the committee to keep the fund accountable. However, the lack of talent with sufficient knowledge about Safe’s ecosystem makes such a solution potentially impracticable.
With that in mind, we should carefully examine the need to create a structure that would potentially transfer power from the team and the tokenholders to delegates - a third stakeholder group with a vastly different payout function (they have no downside exposure).