You’re raising an extremely important point, of course. What you’re also getting at is the distribution of voting power which is being discussed at length in this thread, and far from being conclusively discussed. In short, this issue to me is extremely important but on a different timeline/scope than SEP-3, simply because the token distribution and definition of voting power has been defined in the past and any changes to that practically couldn’t be ratified before this proposal is envisioned to be ratified. Meaning, we can talk but not change the distribution of voting power during the scope and timeline of SEP-3.
That said, we can talk about it and we should. By the end of next week, I intend to share a list of wallets, their voting power and which stakeholder group they belong to. Most of that information is on-chain data and can be retrieved by anyone, e.g. on GitHub and on this forum. The upcoming blog post will present them in a more approachable way and enrich the list of accounts and their voting power with a categorisation whether they are investor wallets, Guardian wallets or other wallest. Based on that initial information, it will be easier to analyse voter participation in previous and future SEPs and have a more informed discussion on a comprehensive governance framework for SafeDAO.
That said, about the two whales you mentioned:
They are investors indeed and they surely did have a major impact, but they did not decide the vote. Without these two wallest, the result would not have changed and “Make no changes/Decide later” with theoretically 11M votes would still have surpassed “Enable transferability” with 8.3M votes.
This is simply to say that SEP-2 was not flipped by these two accounts but, of course, this does not mean that the criticism you and others in the thread linked above raised is irrelevant – quite the contrary.
Again, your assumption is correct that these wallets are investor wallets. Although I don’t follow the other part of your assumption that these investor wallets are controlled by the Safe team. They are investor wallest who are separate from the core team, have their own opinions and vote independently, of course. What makes you think that control would be in place?
Surely, there are aligned incentives, like there are aligned incentives among every single holder of SAFE. Surely, there are informal communications channels among individuals, including Safe team member ↔ Investor team member. The general principle which I’m pushing for as hard as I can is that every discussion that is vital to governance and the decision-making process in SafeDAO must take place in this publicly accessible governance forum.
If you are referring to this point by @raynemang, I can reassure you that this has nothing to do with any control the Safe team exercises. I have yet to inquire and write up the full story which will be part of a wider transparency initiative, but the short story is that investor wallets are set up as a Safe (yes, Safe is dogfooding 
) with the Safe Ecosystem Foundation as one signer next to the investors’ wallets. @raynemang refers to Stefan George being involved, when in fact he is just involved as a formality through the Safe Ecosystem Foundation. Further details are yet to be inquired and written up when we go more into the legal setup of SafeDAO and the Safe Ecosystem Foundation.
I couldn’t agree more. We’ve seen way too many DAOs recently that don’t deserve to be called one and crypto Twitter is slowly waking up to realise that too. I’m convinced that SafeDAO absolutely is on a journey to becoming a DAO and still at the beginning of progressively decentralising. You’re right that this process can only be effective with an appropriate level of transparency. The post on accounts per stakeholder group mentioned above must just be the start here.