Discussion about SafeDAO voting power

This is what the team originally said:

No single known entity or person holds more than 10% of the initial voting power.

The Fact, 32M votes in SEP #2, so it’s 25% and 12.5%, 37.5% by 2 addresses.

The discussion starts here [SEP #2] Community Initiative To Unpause Token Contract (Enabling Transferability) - #160 by nodeE

These are the main reasons for this discussion, which originally only took place in the SEP #2 thread, but since many people said that this situation is not reasonable(I actually see more criticism on Twitter and Discord, such as https://twitter.com/safegovernance/status/1589954526957932544 but for convenience I’m only quoting what people say in the forums), I think it is necessary to start a discussion thread.

According to the team’s chart

Given that Gnosis DAO and Core Contributor did not participate in any existing voting, and due to their official background, I don’t think they will participate in any voting with high probability.

The same is true, in SEP #2, only three groups users/guardians/investors participated in the voting.

According to the data, at present, users have claimed about 6.77 million tokens, and guardians have claimed about 10.07 million tokens. Since this is only about half of the actual voting rights (the other half is linearly unlocked for 4 years), users have about 13.54 million SAFE voting rights. Guardians have about 20.14 million votes.
Investors have roughly 80 million votes.

this means, the real situation is
SafeDAO Voting Power

At the current rate of claims (about 50 a day, this chart is valid until the end of the claim period)

Don’t you think it’s a serious problem?

  • Yes, it’s a problem
  • No, works well
0 voters

Due to the serious problems with the token distribution of the team (in my opinion), the reallocation of tokens is a bit difficult, it also involves the profit of investors, and to be honest, the investment of investors in the bear market reflects their contribution to Safe , it is not unreasonable to allocate a large number of tokens to them, but it is very unreasonable to allocate the same amount of voting power to investors.


My opinion
Must know that although the existing various DAO voting mechanisms seem to have no problems for the time being, even in SEP #1 DAO seems to be quite united, but when the interests of different groups conflict, the problem of unfair DAO voting is very obvious.

In fact I don’t think there’s a need for a vote that everyone would agree with, it’s the vote that’s divided that deserves further discussion.

Users should have 40% voting power, guardians 35%, and investors 25%, which is significantly more fair considering the number of participants.

So I propose weighted voting to balance the voting power of different groups as an anti-whale measure.

0-20000 votes X 3.3
20,000-2,000,000 votes X 1.9
Over 2 million votes X 0.35

  • Good Plan
  • Other methods
0 voters

I don’t think Snapshot can achieve such a function, but we can recalculate the voting results after the voting ends, which can lead to a more fair voting result.
Tokens are currently not transferrable, so this approach works fairly well.
After the token is transferable, this method will no longer work (whales can assign tokens to different addresses), so I think this method is only applicable to the vote of SEP #2, I hope to do the next vote on transferability , you can use this temporary method.

As for the long-term issue of voting power, this becomes more complicated once the tokens are transferable. I think @lukas mentioned

It is an effective measure, but it needs more discussion, I am not a DAO expert, but I have browsed @theobtl’s personal website, he seems to have a fairly deep research on DAO(https://theodorbeutel.de/), I hope you can give some opinions on this.


As the DAO matures over time those ratios will change, same as to when the token becomes transferable. I think our attention should be put towards more important topics like growing the DAO instead of debating voting power.


I’m under the assumption— unless proven otherwise —that GnosisDAO did indeed vote and/or the owners of 0xc894dCacaCF66d904264e47c08a987e64b48c57C which owns the two large voter addresses is aware of the vote.

  1. 0xfB2aD9007F2D62a973f71Af206242eE4bD790b2C
  2. 0x7c3d54Be8dD9946dA59feD648bfAD294ae17105E

This EOA: 0x9F7dfAb2222A473284205cdDF08a677726d786A0 is a signer for GnosisDAO Multisigs and has transactions with numerous wallets affiliated with GnosisDAO and the owner is linked to via this Balancer proposal for ‘Multisig Signer Replacements’ which means the address is trusted and used across the ecosystem. It also discloses the associated owner as Stefan from Gnosis.



What the next ? Stefan bad guy , he no comment our thread , he decline our sep #2 , i think we need kick Stefan and Stefan friends for snapshot , now i think we need block vote if user have more 2kk tokens .


People you are here ?

1 Like

Good analysis :+1: :+1:

It seems possible that stefan participated in this vote, or he participated in this vote on behalf of gnosis dao? Do these voting power belong to him personally or gnosis dao?

If these voting power belong to gnosis dao, but I don’t see any discussion about related voting in gnosis dao, if gnosis dao is going to vote in safedao, at least they should be in the governance forum (https://forum.gnosis.io /) Elect a representative (representative team) to participate in the voting, or to discuss each vote within the DAO. This is in line with the form of DAO governance. Although I know that the voting rights of gnosisdao are actually as centralized as safedao, this is still a necessary process.

Haven’t seen an explanation from the team for these huge votes of unknown origin. Whether power is decentralized enough is a question, but at least some transparency is needed.




Thank you <3

The tokens belong to the safes but it seems they are under ownership by GnosisDAO or at the least, Stefan controls an EOA that may have voted on behalf of GnosisDAO.

I agree with you fren! It’s not completely clear what is really going on here without some added transparency


I just read this article written by lukas and I have to admit he is a pretty good crypto industry expert, a genius.

The safe team has built a really great product and has always had a reasonable path forward, which makes it hard for me to have any negative comments on this product itself.

SafeDAO should be as good as Safe, and should also represent the most advanced level of the crypto industry, but the current situation of SafeDAO is obviously a bit disappointing (at least for most people).

I know SafeDAO is still immature, and I hope SafeDAO can get better.
I also agree with @Melodic_Platypus that maybe this situation will be resolved after the tokens are transferable.

But just like @raynemang and @LunaMaxi said, The team should let the community know who these whale voters are, I don’t think all users in SEP#2 combined have as many votes as this 8M voter, he obviously needs to explain his vote or at least let us know who is he. This is a basic transparency requirement.

@lukas @theobtl


Same here ser, I only want some clarity. I’ve followed the project close since I got into the space.

The first safe I created: 0x86d49e5484A682E6cc96Cb158f425549ea8fC3C5

I’ve been using Safe since the first versions. And I’ve never had issues, I’ve even taught many, many people how to deploy safes, navigate third party apps (safely) and tons of troubleshooting.

At one point I even wrote a guide for how to successfully use Gnosis when message signing was difficult or unsupported— and believe me, that took hours to troubleshoot and find a way around message signing with the safe contract.

Having dealt with a ‘shadow’ DAO before, I want this to be different because the space deserves it.


Well, I decided to ask Twitter too: https://twitter.com/raynemang/status/1592575257491443713


Thank you for the positivity and I’m glad to see that your goals align.

excuses my grammar here as i am not proofing this…

If I look at this situation narrowly then yes, I agree that clarification on why these two wallets voted against unlocking would be helpful in moving forward; however, when I see the bigger picture, it all doesn’t really matter.

What happens when another vote comes by that u disagree with and was decided by 3 or 4 wallets? do you want them to dox and explain to u why? there will only be satisfaction when everyone agrees with your options.

Those with more voting power were granted that because of their hard work and dedication to building the project. Their options should matter regardless if they explain them in detail or simply cast a vote. The idea that stronger decentralization equals more people is flawed and probably why we as an industry are struggling to keep DAO’s alive.

Those that offer more value should have more votes, that simple. The airdrop was the first step in realizing those values. The second step should be recognizing those with value and bringing them to the spotlight. Token unlocking will obscure our value as a voter before we even know what our value is worth.

We don’t need a vote to contribute something meaningful.

1 Like

haha no

This is indeed a basic transparency requirement, especially when the DAO participation structure fixed now.

I’m not denying anyone’s contribution, but you must know that the voting power of these two whale voters (12M) is greater than all users combined.

If you think that DAO only needs 5 people to participate (already more than 50% of the voting power), then what is the point of voting by more than a thousand community members?

If the team does not explain who these whale voters are, then all normal users should not participate in the next vote, because their vote will change nothing.

Do you think I’m wrong? :smiley:


Excellent point of view fren!

My only qualm with this is lack of transparency. I won’t stand for a lack of transparency in the space anymore

Even a simple response from whomever the voters are : simply don’t agree

I will take that

but no more will I stand by and allow people to blanket cast votes

Esp. majority holders or accounts with such large holdings — because it sways the vote in their favour which is against decentralization because it amounts to single point of failure (Very much like a board of directors)

Governance systems get abused that way plain and simple


Do you think this DAO was decided by you or me?

No, this DAO is currently in the hands of these two whale voters, and the opinions of others are worthless.

Could you please tell me what it means for the majority of the remaining community members to participate in governance?

1 Like

No, u are right that the current balance is not in favor of the majority on voters. The calculations used in the airdrop should have been argued more for reaching it’s final stage of approval (a disagreed with the second airdrop calculation as it tripled the eligible users and diluted voting power for users with value to add).

If you are airdropped close to the minimum amount of 400 then your vote is worthless, what’s the point of the airdrop then? it’s to delegate to your respective representative that shares your values. So a DAO with transferless tokens is a delegation market. Market yourself.

What is the standard number or participates to determine if a DAO is truly decentralized? :thinking:

Also, in all your comments, only wallets that have voted are mentioned when calculating the ratio of total voting power. Are u forgetting that only a very small amount of the overall voting power actually voted? it’s misleading information to those that don’t understand how it works.

At least not 5

Am I correct?

Especially for a “public good”

Are we arguing that these two wallets should dox themselves because they went against the vote? are we looking for accountability? peace of mind? idk, it just seems like there’s no means to an end going this route.

As there’s a lot of voters that did not participate, would the reaction have been the same if 20 or 30 whales voted against?

wrong, those two wallets would not have effected the results of the latest vote.