Quick question, did the proposal went into snapshot without any change?
Yes, just the SEP number was added
May I ask, what is the rationale behind it? After the governance call and low delegate feedback.
No mean to be disruptive, I am genuinely curious.
Thank you for this proposal, @Andre, and for the transparency regarding Safe Labs, Safe Research, and the āCypherpriseā vision. At Kleros Cooperative, we support this proposal, as we believe it is crucial for a DAO to focus on clearly defining a vision and targeted goals.
In the past, a similar approach was successfully implemented in the Arbitrum DAO, which allowed the DAO to define key success metrics for capital allocation (see: Incentives Detox Proposal).
However, in the long term, we believe it is important to incentivize projects to build and strengthen the Safe ecosystem, with a focus on āimpact.ā This can be achieved by leveraging innovative approaches like āFutarchy for Grant Allocationā. At Kleros Cooperative, we have the resources and the expertise to help make this happen and would love to propose something that aligns with the DAOās structure when the timing is appropriate.
Thanks for the thoughtful comments here.
The Arbitrum Detox that @0xAlex mentions offers relevant lessons - they paused incentives to establish clear success metrics before resuming with programs like Entropy DRIP that better align spending with ecosystem goals. I wrote about this a few months back: The Arbitrum Incentives Detox - Sovereign Signal
The key will be designing a framework that rewards ecosystem advancement rather than activity theater. Iād caution against trying to figure out all the nuance upfront - better to start testing approaches in small sprints and iterate based on what actually works.
Most DAOs struggle with this balance and none have really cracked sustainable grant allocation over time. Would be good to see Safe emerge from this pause with specific metrics for what āadvancing key ecosystem prioritiesā means in practice.
HTH!
Late to the party here, sorry.
I donāt mind the idea of pausing resource allocation for a period of time. Although Iād prefer for the pause to automatically expire unless explicitly extended by either the SEF or the SafeDAO. This would create more of a forcing function.
Iād like more clarity on this statement. It reads as if it would indefinitely and irreversibly give the Foundation Council sole the right to make treasury management proposals.
This feels very wrong to me.
There is no good reason for the SafeDAO to relinquish this right.
It is quite another thing for the SafeDAO to delegate that role exclusively to the Foundation Council for a pre-defined period of time, while also retaining the ability to revoke that delegation.
For these reasons, Iām going to vote against this proposal in its current form. But would reconsider if this second point is addressed.
Who will step into the seat from which Christoph is departing?
The delegated right to the SEF to submit proposals re Treasury management can be brought back under the scope of the DAO by governance vote.
Thanks for the clarification, @Andre ![]()
Iād still prefer that these decisions be explicitly timebound, rather than requiring another DAO vote, but Iām ok with the proposal given this clarification.
Will vote to support.
I assume that such a proposal can be brought forward by the whole community and not only the SEF?
Yes exactly. The community can propose and vote to bring back the right to submit treasury management proposals under the scope of the DAO.
The proposal ā[SEP 54] Temporary pause on resource allocation of SafeDAOā was accepted.
