My point wasn’t that I have an issue with token distribution - I don’t. As stated before, the Safe team and investors have contributed to the project up to now and I think they SHOULD have the primary say in how the token rolls out.
My point was that most token holders are privy to the same information as Safe team members yet, and that transparency would help bridge that gap. The blog post you mention would be a welcome info drop.
As you have identified, the largest current information asymmetry is between the community and the Safe team/investors. It feels like the Safe team and investors have a vision towards enabling token transferability. My criticism isn’t against that vision (outlined in this post) or the fact that the team/investors are setting this vision with their token weight (I’m glad for it, in fact).
My criticism is that this is being framed as a community vote when the options and outcome are all being set by the team/investors. I’d rather the team and investors set the vision, communicate it, and save community votes for things upon which the community can actually have an impact.
Fully agree. That’s coming, it’s just a huge chunk of data that needs quite some work to keep it accurate (query token balances, calculate voting power for all snapshot voting strategies, include delegated voting power, etc.)
Simply to be meaningful. Two milestones are imminent.
That was part the proposal since the beginning and there weren’t any requests to change that until now. Do you disagree?
If any further changes to the proposal are required and we can align on them within the next few days, I think that’d be desirable.
So far, most issues seemed (super important! but) out of scope, such as using weighted voting which requires a separate governance SEP, more transparency on distribution of voting power which is part of a post in the making, and discussion around other voting mechanism’s such as QV which are also part of a governance SEP.
Based on your concerns, how specifically would you change the proposal?
Otherwise, I’m not aware of specific changes needed and would consider the proposal final from my POV that could go to snapshot six days after the last change which was yesterday.
Thank you for writing this ser! Greatly appreciate your responses — that clears a lot of my findings and I’m overall a lot less concerned. It’s just good to know who may be behind an 0x… or what their intentions are
It might consume more of your time if your job is to be on top of every governance discussion. (Is that your job btw?) Most people don’t read every post/comment/discussion before they decide how they are voting.
Back to this SEP…I’d you truly want to take this to snapshot with the proper form and address @ittaisvidler ’s concerns as quickly as possible, how about…
Option 1 - tie milestones to token transferability
Option 2 - make no changes
Option 3 - abstain
In an ideal scenario, you would have gathered soft consensus on the option 1 choice ahead of time (perhaps in the form of discord polls or discourse polls). Since you didn’t get soft consensus, then limit scope of hard consensus on tying milestones that the whale wallets want to transferability. I suspect that will get you the outcome you want.
Obviously, that’s true oftentimes across the DAO space today, but what do you think should be true?
SafeDAO is still super early and we’re shaping it to improve its design. Meaningful and effective governance is a major part of that and people voting randomly is not a standard we should accept, I think. We already have a delegation system in place (which needs to be improved and expanded on) and every recipient of the airdrop could delegate their tokens if they wouldn’t want to vote themselves. Presumably, we have quite a lot of individual voters and delegates who choose to do so and have an informed opinion, but that’s always to be improved of course. Curious to hear any suggestions!
Since you asked, my job is to coordinate SafeDAO while it’s coming into place, from responding here on the forum to researching governance frameworks and much in between. But I personally don’t matter here at all. When I say we might want to be mindful of attention, I’m only referring to the aggregate of all DAO participants including yourself.
You already stated the problem of people not having an informed opinion when they vote and I believe spreading information across even more channels would be counter productive.
I’m working on a better process to condense the discussion inside a thread, which is at times overwhelming as you’ve rightly pointed out. Thinking of a forum post quoting others and presenting opposing opinions, followed by a community call on each SEP where the author is up for an AMA. Does that seem useful?
What do you think I want? I don’t have a preferred outcome and I’m not supposed to as DAO coordinator. I’m putting this proposal up based on previously mentioned opinions and trying to coordinate the aggregation and identification of preferences here.
I am strongly opposed to this proposal, I am in no hurry to enable transferability (I hope to enable transferability next year when the market is better, and I think most people think so), I just think this proposal is not necessarily related at all.
You list some proposals that haven’t been progressed for a long time, I don’t see anyone advancing these proposals at all (such as [Discussion] Safe DAO Resource Allocation Model (OBRA)[Discussion] SafeDAO Constitution, no one continues to comment, and the proposal author does not advance the proposal), and once the proposal initiator chooses forever Without moving proposals into the SEP stage, transferability-related voting can never begin, which means enabling transferability depends not only on the opinion of whales, but also on the willingness of the authors of these related proposals. It would be foolish to use these “zombie proposals” as the basis for constraining the next transfer vote.
Please don’t take us for fools. In fact, everyone understands that almost all investors voted against in sep2, and the voting rights held by investors are decisive, and the votes of other community members are meaningless.
What is certain is that almost all investors have their own financial interests at heart, and they will definitely want to enable token transferability when the market is better and their tokens are about to be unlocked.
I don’t see any milestones in this proposal that correlate to market conditions, in fact that’s the only milestone that makes sense.
Sorry for being blunt, it’s true.
You think it is very important to confirm this proposal before the end of the claim period. Unfortunately, I think the most important proposal at present is to reach a consensus with most community members on the issue of voting power. Now most people have understood whether they participate in governance There is no difference. The result of the proposal is determined by several whales. You’d better let the community members find the meaning of participation first, instead of continuing to initiate such fake empty proposals.
You don’t respect other community members. In fact, I saw that the proposal of @links[SEP #X] Improve Communication in SafeDAO entered the SEP stage earlier, but your proposal entered the SEP stage directly without discussion (phase0), and it is more advanced than the proposal of links. Getting the number early, maybe you think only your proposal is important, and it seems autocratic too.
Of course, this is not the first time you have done this. Both @b1k00[SEP # ] Make The Safe Token Transferable and @netrunner.ethSafe Grants Program (SGP) once asked you to number the proposals, but you rejected them. In any case, the proposals of community members can only become a sep after being approved by the team.
What a great DAO
Rome wasn’t built in a day and I find it reasonable for fundamental proposals like the constitution, a resource allocation framework and others to take their time. When SafeDAO launched with its governance token, there was virtually nothing in place and that’s only some weeks ago. That said, your view is absolutely legitimate of course and if option 1 doesn’t reflect your opinion, ‘make no changes’ would, wouldn’t it? If not, how would you change the proposal?
To keep the discussion here on the proposal itself, for your fair concerns around transparency, I’d like to defer to the upcoming post to document accounts holding SAFE, their voting power and whether they belong to the groups of investors, Guardians or other. I also agree that we need a better way to label SEPs, as discussed here and elsewhere before. How would you go about it?
The first proposal you linked was a duplicate of SEP-2 and the latter is connected to OBRA, which are both currently blocked from outstanding legal work to ensure SafeDAO can hold and manage funds. The communications proposal will of course receive a number too as soon as it is ready. Proposals always receive an SEP-number when it is appropriate which is currently done by any forum moderator and could be expanded to a group of Guardians, for example.
To come back to this proposal again and specifically the question how we proceed from here, we’ve got two options:
Leave the proposal unchanged as it is and ratify it on Snapshot before Dec 27 when the claiming period ends.
Take more time to align on this proposal and have it ratified after Dec 27 when the claiming period ends.
Please like this comment if you agree to move forward with a Snapshot vote, or otherwise comment with your suggested change.
That said, I’d like to stress again that we covered a lot of room for improvement in this proposal which this proposal in itself cannot solve, but must be tackled through separate SEPs. Mostly as part of a governance framework, e.g. allowing multiple-choice voting, improving the way SEPs get labeled and more. The lack of transparency around accounts and their voting power is also not an issue this proposal can solve, but must and will be tackled independently. Meaning, by moving forward with this proposal, I’m just trying to bring this over the finish line so that we can tackle the other issues independently.
I’ve seen many people mention milestones related to market conditions, and this has always been my opinion, and I think market conditions are the most important conditions to enable transferability, and can reach a certain consensus among most community members and investors.
If the community needs an indicator to measure market conditions, I think the Crypto Fear & Greed Index is a very good indicator. It is created by combining market conditions and people’s emotions. It is the best indicator for measuring the launch time of tokens. My personal suggestion is that when the index reaches 50, a vote to enable transferability can be considered.
I know that some people may not like being so direct, but I think the real basis for most people to vote is indeed the market situation, and I recommend using this indicator as a criterion for whether to vote again.
All good points! If I imagine I’d personally find the market environment important, I’d be annoyed if the indicator is 49 but the threshold we defined is 50 while otherwise everything seems to have fallen perfectly into place.
Meaning, constraining us artificially now might not make sense here.
We all know that these models never perfectly predict the future.
How about not including such an indicator, instead vote for option 1 or ‚make no changes‘ (i.e., no milestone) and have the market environment discussion informally as the proposal author and in this forum when the time comes?
In my opinion, the proposal is fine as it stands, and we could proceed with the Snapshot vote.
For me, the crucial thing is, that this proposal serves “only” as a non-binding signaling vote, whose success relies more on a social contract between all DAO participants than creating bureaucratic roadblocks.
I imagine that this proposal could prove to be useful for:
a) being referenced in case of arising questions and/or new (premature) proposals around the topic of token transferability
b) creating community consensus on the timeline until enabling token transferability
Of course, the non-binding nature of this proposal weakens its impact, but at the same time, prevents the creation of bureaucratic roadblocks that may be today’s community consensus, but not tomorrow’s, which is a problematic almost cancerous development that unfortunately happens too often in many large organizations and states.
Fully agree with your points and about the way you summarise the nature of this proposal.
For the record, I’ll just quote the relevant sections again for clarity:
Of course, the DAO must not ignore the outcome of this proposal and the (if any) set of milestones the winning option includes. Although in principle, any new SEP can change or overrule earlier SEPs, including this one. I see barely any downside or risk in having this proposal with its non-bureaucratic nature, while the upside may be quite substantial from getting clarity on a roadmap and allocation our attention to working on other proposals in the meantime
A potential workaround due to ranked choice and other voting strategies not being possible currently is for all 5 milestones to be voted on simultaneously during the same voting period as separate SEPs.
Whichever milestone proposals pass are then the ones followed before the next transferability vote.