[SEP #2] Community Initiative To Unpause Token Contract (Enabling Transferability)

I was looking forward to Safe governance. I’m not so sure anymore.

What is happening here with the vote?

There are two addresses with no on-chain history and they have 12M votes. I don’t mind if what I vote for doesn’t get chose, however, this is a clear red flag.

Can someone help me make sense of these two addresses?



Seeing as there are concern around the voting power of the minority user group, how about making a proposal to redistribute unclaimed airdrop tokens equally among wallets that participated in the snapshot votes up until the claiming period ends?


  • encourages more users to claim and participate
  • gives more voting power to those that want to participate


  • the additional voting power to the minority is not enough to outweigh the top ten wallets
  • adds more tokens into circulation
  • those that delegated would be excluded

any feedback?

  • Yea
  • Nay

0 voters

Let me try to summarise the main arguments, based on previous statements in this thread [quoted] or on Twitter [linked]:


I’ve removed the offensive words, apologies if you feel offended. @theobtl @lukas

For you and lukas, we are not enemies.

Before this FTX bankruptcy, I withdrew all my crypto assets from CEX to my SAFE, in fact I trust this product quite a bit.

It’s just that during the governance process, I feel quite powerless and exhausted.

You should know why I am angry, DAO (decentralized autonomous organization), but from the current situation, the voting rights are quite centralized, and the governance process is strongly dependent on the team (theobtl) to advance, so SafeDAO really cannot be called DAO at this stage. .

I acknowledge the great contributions of the Guardians, and they are mostly relevant industry experts, so I endorse their votes (except corbin and realshelbyt).

But you must understand that everyone is not a fool. In this vote, two addresses have a voting power of 12M, and only 32M participated in the vote, which means that this vote was almost decided by 2 people.

Some people are inconvenient to criticize you, but everyone understands that this is dictatorship.

Investors can sell tokens for profit, which they deserve, but when investors have too much voting power, the entire product is jeopardized. While Safe Team assigns decisive voting rights to investors, some investors choose to remain fair (such as @pet3rpan-1kx ), and some investors do not realize the impact of their votes.

The result of this vote is make no changes, and I agree with this result.
But this obviously can’t be called a DAO vote, it’s not a fair vote.

Given that the current token distribution has been fixed, Safe Team’s previous mistakes are irreversible.
I suggest to consider an effective scheme to achieve fair DAO voting, splitting the voting of normal users and investors/guardians, the specific scheme still needs to be discussed. You can refer to Optimism’s gov system.

Under the existing proportional distribution of voting rights, the problem of unfair voting will exist for a long time, and SEP2 only highlights the seriousness of this problem.


It’s rather hilarious that you’ve only picked comments that are in favor of delay, I suggest the team try to be as neutral as possible in other community members’ proposals, at least you should pick some comments against delay.

This is why I say that SafeDAO is not a DAO, it is not autonomous, and the process must rely on the team to advance (the SEP number and the Twitter announcement all depend on the team’s willingness), and the team cannot neutrally consider the opinions of community members.


While I don’t have any issue with the results of the vote, or even how the vote is decided (on-chain Governance has always been token-based, which has equal pros and cons), I do think more transparency on these larger wallets should be provided.

The two top voters appear to be delegates of some sort? Their Safe addresses seemed to have been created solely for this purpose, as they have no other activity.


I’m a bit shaky on the internals of Snapshot; is there a way to get a list of delegators to these addresses and what their effective holdings are?

Edit: I’m also doubly concerned, as their signatures do not pass validation on the associated signator.io link.


I feel strongly about taking as much as a neutral stance here whenever I’m trying to coordinate our governance activities. I’m welcoming criticism and suggestions any time.

In this case, the whole point of my write-up was to summarize all comments on how to proceed if SEP-2 did not pass. By definition, this does not include arguments why it should pass or what we should do once it has passed.

Many of those who voted against SEP-2 already commented on that. Those who voted for rarely did, so I especially ask everyone who has voted for SEP-2 to review the post above, make up their own mind and share their suggestions on how we should proceed.

Specifically, what are the conditions, milestones and achievements we want to clear first before voting on transferability again?


pls reply on my post up)

1 Like

I’m not sure what else to say. I’ve commented on that point three times now. It’s also not up to me, neither is this thread supposed to resolve your point. We can come back to it when we discuss a governance framework and then I’d be curious to hear others‘ opinions too.

1 Like

I think (almost 100%) this is the investor’s addresses.

I suggest that in subsequent votes (before enable transferability), only guardian and user votes are considered, and investor votes should not be counted.

This is a very serious issue, because the disapproval votes of the two investors in this vote directly exceeded 37.5%, and it is reasonable for this vote and the benefits of investors Clearly relevant, they should shy away from such a vote. Otherwise they can wait until their lot of tokens are unlocked before enabling transferability to sell outright.

Or as Bruce said, votes larger than 2M don’t count.


A little digging shows that the two safe contracts share an owner — which is also a safe contract

  1. 0xfB2aD9007F2D62a973f71Af206242eE4bD790b2C
  2. 0x7c3d54Be8dD9946dA59feD648bfAD294ae17105E

  1. One of the owner addresses —0xD7Df130531Ef4fADF91Fa16D96fa3C49358A7AD1— of the shared owner safe has a txn on Gnosis Chain for a dAppCon ticket, being one of 35 addresses holding one of these. It was organized by Gnosis DAO.
  1. One of the addresses hasn’t done anything: 0x3242071b0b406B6661AF2dE1115CD46567Ab0917

  2. One of the other appears to be linked to Gnosis Multisigs: 0x9F7dfAb2222A473284205cdDF08a677726d786A0


Discourse automatically flagged your post as spam (presumably because of the many 0x addresses?). Your post should be visible now.


Bless you ser, @theobtl! Yeah, could certainly seem like a spam message.

Especially because I’ve mainly just lurked and read the posts on the forum. However, I feel like I shouldn’t stand on the sidelines so much

Seems like a great bunch in here that is concerned over the future of Safe DAO

Love to see it :smile:


I quite agree with you


I put some more of my conclusions here about the recent vote: Discussion about SafeDAO voting power - #4 by raynemang


Thank you for this, i agree

perhaps we should encourage SAFE team (and ourselves) to label whale accounts if possible (not suggesting doxxing, just contextual info using and ENS domain or something)


People chose to delegate their voting power to these addresses man


@Daniel Maybe it’s worth recreating a vote? Just for confidence.

maybe, but I’m not sure about that

seems reasonable enough to assume


I went to look because that makes a lot of sense tbh

but, both of the voters—0xfB2aD9007F2D62a973f71Af206242eE4bD790b2C , 0x7c3d54Be8dD9946dA59feD648bfAD294ae17105E— haven’t claimed and the UI says that they were awarded the tokens


If recreate, you don’t have to do the actions to turn the modules on/off. Unpause only