My understanding is that there are two bugs:
- If your safe was created with factory v1.0.0 your vote won’t count.
- If you used the new Safe UI (before it was fixed) your vote won’t count.
(2) has since been fixed, but I don’t know that (1) has.
My understanding is that there are two bugs:
(2) has since been fixed, but I don’t know that (1) has.
He has about 190k tokens, I think someone like him deserves more voting power, he knows if and when to enable transferability, and provided a specific plan, much better than those who hold a lot of voting power but can’t even provide a convincing reason.
That’s right, the result of this vote is not important now, this is an unfair vote.
theobtl](Profile - theobtl - Safe Community Forum)
I believe that the vote was dishonest, since there was a BAG. Whether it affected the final result or not, the fact that the process was broken.
My suggestion is to start a new vote after the token claims are spent on December 28th. On December 29, people will be able to vote and in the new year 23, the token can be unpaused. I think it would be fair, what do you say?
Also, my opinion (only opinion) is to exclude people who have more than 2 million tokens, because 2000 people with 1000 tokens can create 2 million tokens and only 1 will create 8. We do not have the ability to buy tokens so that we can talk about honesty, and if this person continues to use the amount of his tokens to lobby for his interests, it will be nonsense! This is what we all talked about, GLOBAL DICTATORY when in the hands of a couple of people the key to control the DAO.
These makes sense to me
disappointing vote, don’t know how could things going like this…
What’s the point of governance if voting only takes a few people to decide?
Like 2 people over 50% voting rights?
This is a valid point, but a longer discussion for sure. When @nodeE brought this point up two days ago, we discussed it quite a bit. It just seems to be the case that there are different ideas about how SafeDAO’s governance should be designed. Although I think we all agree that SafeDAO’s governance is early, immature and can be improved.
When you say that not being able to buy voting power is a problem, I’m not sure if everyone would agree. It’s for a reason that ‘soulbound tokens’ have become quite popular recently when the default state is that the richest and most liquid individual can buy the most voting power. This is also extremely contradictive to the idea of one-person, one-vote which you have argued for as well before.
At the end of the day, I’m not sure that the wider community (not only those actively commenting here) would want to get rid of the current system completely. Guardians earned their status based on valuable contributions to the Safe ecosystem. Instead of getting rid of it, we may be better advised to keep and fundamentally improve it?
There are also lots of other exciting, innovative experiments happening around DAO governance, such as:
Now that SEP-2 is off the table for now is a good time to discuss these and work towards a governance framework for SafeDAO that is state of the art.
In parallel to working on a governance framework (and potentially other fundamental proposals), I’d suggest we go back to the drawing board and agree on which conditions we want to see met before there will be a second vote on enabling transferability.
Below is a collection of arguments people shared above on this thread:
I agree that most of the people are asking to start voting on December 28, immediately after the unclaimed tokens are returned to the DAO.
Regarding the defenders, I understand that they deserve their tokens, BUT the problem is not that they have so many tokens, but the problem is that we are not equal with them, for example:
2 defenders can have a total of 10 million tokens, and 1000-2000 people can give that much in total.
And now the question is whether the opinion of 2-3 defenders and 2000 people is equal? Let’s imagine that the DAO is a kingdom (God save the queen) and imagine that the kingdom is headed by 3 defenders who have ±10 million tokens, and the kingdom has 2000 citizens.
And so the king decides to raise taxes and votes as a result of 2000 people are equal to only 2 defenders and the vote of the 3rd defender tips the scales. The vote, as it were, was held and the king can say that this is the choice of the people, but is it not clear that the people do not decide anything? The number of votes cannot be bought, and thus we have a dictatorship.
I suppose you will say that if the tokens were on sale, a large investor (Big FISH) could buy votes and thus also lobby their interests, yes! But only then would everyone have the opportunity to buy votes, and so you handed votes to people about whom we know nothing and during the last vote they do not hear us. 1600+ people FOR and ± 130 people against.
I believe that the DAO is not 130 people, but more than 2100 members, and most of them were FOR. I believe that DECENTRALIZATION involves FREEDOM and not a point distribution of gold in 1 hand!
I was looking forward to Safe governance. I’m not so sure anymore.
What is happening here with the vote?
There are two addresses with no on-chain history and they have 12M votes. I don’t mind if what I vote for doesn’t get chose, however, this is a clear red flag.
Can someone help me make sense of these two addresses?
Seeing as there are concern around the voting power of the minority user group, how about making a proposal to redistribute unclaimed airdrop tokens equally among wallets that participated in the snapshot votes up until the claiming period ends?
Let me try to summarise the main arguments, based on previous statements in this thread [quoted] or on Twitter [linked]:
For you and lukas, we are not enemies.
Before this FTX bankruptcy, I withdrew all my crypto assets from CEX to my SAFE, in fact I trust this product quite a bit.
It’s just that during the governance process, I feel quite powerless and exhausted.
You should know why I am angry, DAO (decentralized autonomous organization), but from the current situation, the voting rights are quite centralized, and the governance process is strongly dependent on the team (theobtl) to advance, so SafeDAO really cannot be called DAO at this stage. .
I acknowledge the great contributions of the Guardians, and they are mostly relevant industry experts, so I endorse their votes (except corbin and realshelbyt).
But you must understand that everyone is not a fool. In this vote, two addresses have a voting power of 12M, and only 32M participated in the vote, which means that this vote was almost decided by 2 people.
Some people are inconvenient to criticize you, but everyone understands that this is dictatorship.
Investors can sell tokens for profit, which they deserve, but when investors have too much voting power, the entire product is jeopardized. While Safe Team assigns decisive voting rights to investors, some investors choose to remain fair (such as @pet3rpan-1kx ), and some investors do not realize the impact of their votes.
The result of this vote is make no changes, and I agree with this result.
But this obviously can’t be called a DAO vote, it’s not a fair vote.
Given that the current token distribution has been fixed, Safe Team’s previous mistakes are irreversible.
I suggest to consider an effective scheme to achieve fair DAO voting, splitting the voting of normal users and investors/guardians, the specific scheme still needs to be discussed. You can refer to Optimism’s gov system.
Under the existing proportional distribution of voting rights, the problem of unfair voting will exist for a long time, and SEP2 only highlights the seriousness of this problem.
It’s rather hilarious that you’ve only picked comments that are in favor of delay, I suggest the team try to be as neutral as possible in other community members’ proposals, at least you should pick some comments against delay.
This is why I say that SafeDAO is not a DAO, it is not autonomous, and the process must rely on the team to advance (the SEP number and the Twitter announcement all depend on the team’s willingness), and the team cannot neutrally consider the opinions of community members.
While I don’t have any issue with the results of the vote, or even how the vote is decided (on-chain Governance has always been token-based, which has equal pros and cons), I do think more transparency on these larger wallets should be provided.
The two top voters appear to be delegates of some sort? Their Safe addresses seemed to have been created solely for this purpose, as they have no other activity.
I’m a bit shaky on the internals of Snapshot; is there a way to get a list of delegators to these addresses and what their effective holdings are?
Edit: I’m also doubly concerned, as their signatures do not pass validation on the associated signator.io link.
I feel strongly about taking as much as a neutral stance here whenever I’m trying to coordinate our governance activities. I’m welcoming criticism and suggestions any time.
In this case, the whole point of my write-up was to summarize all comments on how to proceed if SEP-2 did not pass. By definition, this does not include arguments why it should pass or what we should do once it has passed.
Many of those who voted against SEP-2 already commented on that. Those who voted for rarely did, so I especially ask everyone who has voted for SEP-2 to review the post above, make up their own mind and share their suggestions on how we should proceed.
Specifically, what are the conditions, milestones and achievements we want to clear first before voting on transferability again?
pls reply on my post up)
I’m not sure what else to say. I’ve commented on that point three times now. It’s also not up to me, neither is this thread supposed to resolve your point. We can come back to it when we discuss a governance framework and then I’d be curious to hear others‘ opinions too.
I think (almost 100%) this is the investor’s addresses.
I suggest that in subsequent votes (before enable transferability), only guardian and user votes are considered, and investor votes should not be counted.
This is a very serious issue, because the disapproval votes of the two investors in this vote directly exceeded 37.5%, and it is reasonable for this vote and the benefits of investors Clearly relevant, they should shy away from such a vote. Otherwise they can wait until their lot of tokens are unlocked before enabling transferability to sell outright.
Or as Bruce said, votes larger than 2M don’t count.
A little digging shows that the two safe contracts share an owner — which is also a safe contract
One of the addresses hasn’t done anything: 0x3242071b0b406B6661AF2dE1115CD46567Ab0917
One of the other appears to be linked to Gnosis Multisigs: 0x9F7dfAb2222A473284205cdDF08a677726d786A0