While this proposal seems to make sense from a philosophical point of view, I am worried about its implementation from a tactical point of view.
Who is responsible for all of the administrative work related to this proposal? How much effort is involved to “run the machine” and how can the DAO afford to pay for it when tokens cannot be transferred?
What I see laid out here is asking the DAO to commit to an extremely opionated framework for resource allocation which has not been tested in the DAO. My feeing is it would take more than a single full-time person to maintain it, assuming delegates and DAO members step up to the plate to submit and review proposals. If that doesn’t happen, then this could easily turn into a situation where projects can grab SafeDAO resources without oversight. That’s a lot of risk to take.
Why not start with a smaller version of this and layer on more pieces as we go? We could start by running a round to solicit and fund strategies, and then let the people who submitted the strategies use their budget as they wish? Then we could add initiatives with review as another layer. This would both reduce the risk to SafeDAO on implementing this framework AND surface value-aligned contributors to actually contribute to the DAO.
This proposal also reminds me of a bunch of unanswered questions. It aims to make efficient use of SafeDAO’s resources but…do we even know what those resources are? Do those resources reside in a multisig, and if so, who are the signers?